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THE CUPREME COURT OF THE STATE GF UTAH

WILLIAM DEAN ROGERS and
PATRICIA LEE ROGERS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
M. 0. BITNER CO., a Utah
corporation, BLAINE B. BITNER,
WESTCOR, INC., a Utah corporation,
DOUGLAS MONSON, RICHARD F. JOHNS,
III, D. MURPHY, F. ALONZO BADGER,
UTAH SECURITY MORTGAGE, BONNEVILLE
THRIFT COMPANY, ROYAL K. HUNT, JOHN
S. DAVIS, and HAROLD H. BENNETT,

Civil No. 19224

Defendants-Appellants,
Cross-Claimants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BENNETT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This lawsuit was initiated by the plaintiffs who sought
damages from various defendants arising out of Plaintiffs'
purchase of two lots in a Park City Subdivision.

Respondent

Harold H. Bennett was made a party to the original lawsuit
because of Bennett's claim to a lot purchased by Plaintiffs.
Bennett filed a crossclaim against other defendants alleging
that he had been fraudulently induced to lend money for the
benefit of the developers of the Park City subdivision and
that such obligation was not paid.

Bitner Co. began the work necessary to pre pa re a s ubd i ·:is i·
plat and obtain official approval of that plat from Summtt
county.

(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 126-127;

Ex.

By earl

76-D).

1···

all planning and engineering work necessary for preliminary
approval of the project had been done and preliminary apnrova
of the plat was granted by Summit County in about

Februar~·,

1978, subject to the submission of a bond or escrow aaree:ner.t

to guarantee the financing necessary to construct the subdiv1•:
improvements.

(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 128, 483).

Up to that po1"•t.

all work had been undertaken by Bitner Co. as a sole venture.
(~,

Tr. 484-487).
7.

Before and after preliminary approval for the subd1· io.

plat had been granted, Bitner Co. had discussions with various
parties about the possibility of participating in the proJect.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 486-487; Leland Bitner, Tr.

941).

In

about the spring of 1978, an agreement was almost reached
with one party that was described as a "joint venture".

It

would have provided for a 60/40 split of the gross proceeds
from lot sales.

Bitner Co. would have contributed the land

a~

the subdivision plat and the other party would have out up tr.E
cost to construct the subdivision improvements.
Tr. 491-495).

(Blaine B1 ·.::e:

This offer was eventually rejected by the Bitr.e·

Co. because the other party required the title to the land

t

be put up as collateral for a loan to pay for the subdivis1r
improvements.

(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 129, 495; Leland Bitner,

Tr. 1024).
8.

On or about November 1, 1978, Bitner Co. signed an
-4-

agreement with Westcor concerning the subdivision development.
(Ex. 2 3) .

That agreement consisted of a Uniform Real Estate

contract and several additional pages titled "Exhibits", plus
another page titled "Supplemental Agreement" that apparently
was added at some unknown later date.
357-358).

(Douglas Monson, Tr.

The essential features of this agreement were the

following:
(a)
The sale price stated for the land was based
on an anticipated profit share from sale of lots in the
completed subdivision development.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr.
137-138, 232).
According to Westcor, at least, that
profit share was a 60/40 split of the anticipated gross
sales. The price bore no relation to the value of the
entire tract as undeveloped land.
(Douglas Monson, Tr.
272; John Davis, Tr. 1112).
(b)
The Uniform Real Estate Contract was used at the
insistence of Bitner Co. on advice of its accountants
principally so it could claim certain tax benefits
incident to installment sales of land.
(Blaine Bitner,
Tr. 236-237).
(c)
The term of sale concerning the land stated
a principal amount only. No down payment was required
and no interest was charged on the unpaid balance under
the terms of the contract although an accountant for
Westcor testified that interest was carried on Westcor's
books.
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 272, Ex. 23, p. 7).
No
minimum periodic payment was required either.
Instead
a maximum annual payment was specified that was a requirement for claiming the tax benefit mentioned above.
(Ex.
23-P, p. 4). The agreement further provided that payment
for the land was to be made either from a percentage of
the funds received from individual lot sales or by
assignment of executed lot sale contracts.
(Douglas
Monson, Tr. 270-272; Ex. 23, p. 4).
(d)
Principals of the Bitner Co. and Westcor were
expressly allowed to sell lots and were entitled to a
commission for any sold.
(Ex. 23-P, p. 7). Pursuant to
that provision, Bitner Co. put a billboard on the property
facing the adjacent I-15 freeway advertising lots for
sale and listing the phone number of three principals of
Bitner Co.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 144; Dean Rogers, Tr.
69-70; Ex. 19. Those principals of the Bitner Co. eventually sold nearly one-third of all the lots in the
-5-

subdivision, for which they were paid sales coITITTi:o;s10c1
of more than $12, 000 durinq the oeriod of December, ['lto February, 1979.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 143, 217; St,;r.J,
Kilbourne, Tr. 171).
(e)
Westcor was to be responsible for arranu1n 1
the financing for construction of the subdivision
improvements and for installing the same.
If it was
able to do that for less than the $284,000 estimated
Summit County, then Bitner Co. was entitled to rece1:e
one-half of those savings, plus one-half of any
connection or similar fees that might be collected
from the lot purchasers at a later time.
(Blaine
Bitner, Tr. 139-140, 234-235; Douglas Monson, Tr.
2 7 3; Ex. 2 9 , p. 7) .
(f)
Westcor was required to complete constructioc
of the subdivision improvements within one year follow1c:
execution of the agreement.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 199-2C
Douglas Monson, Tr. 265; Ex. 23-P, p. 7).
9.

The entire project was completed

and

sold in

accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by
Bitner Co. previously.
10.

(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 231).

After Bitner Co. and Westcor signed their agreen•e1,'.

on November 1, Bitner Co. executed an Escrow Fund Agreement
(Ex. 24-P)

that was delivered to Summit County for the purrcoc

of obtaning final approval of the subdivision plat.
Bitner, Tr. 220).

(Blair.e

Although Westcor was supposed to make

al~

financial arrangements incident to that document, Bitner Co.
alone signed as the entity responsible for the development.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 139).

Said agreement also contained recc'"

sentations that Bitner Co. guaranteed completion of the subdivision improvements within 24 months and that the sum of
$284,000 was on deposit with defendant Utah Securitv ~ort

to guarantee the timely completion of those
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 201-202).

-6-

improvement~.

11.

In Januar/, 1979, more than two months after the

Ritner Co. and Westcor agreement was signed, Bitner Co. executed
the Protective Covenants of Park Ridge Estates that were recorded
with Summit County (Ex. 27-P).
12.

(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 220).

Except for some materials that were paid for by

Westcor, all construction of the subdivision improvements in
Park Ridge Estates was performed by a company owned and operated
by Blaine B. Bitner, the president of Bitner Co. or by others
under contract with Bitner Co.

(Dean Rogers, Tr. 34; Blaine

Bitner, Tr. 140-141).
13.

No funds had been or were later deposited to the

escrow account at Utah Security Mortgage described in the
aforementioned Escrow Fund Agreement (Ex.
Monson, Tr.
14.

24-P).

(Douglas

395-396).

Defendants Blaine Bitner, Douglas Monson, and John

Davis testified that in February, 1980, certain lot owners
initiated a lawsuit in the Summit County Court (Jim Lynn, et ux.
v. Westcor, et al., Case No. 5985)

that alleged among other

things, fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the
aforementioned Escrow Fund Agreement.

Bitner Co., Blaine B.

Bitner, Westcor and Douglas Monson (an officer of Westcor) were
named defendants in that action and all were there represented
by John Davis,

just as in the instant case.

Tr. 253; Douglas Monson, Tr.

348, 386).

(Blaine Bitner,

Those witnesses acknow-

ledged that they took the position in the Lynn case that their
respective positions in connection with the Park Ridge project
are identical, and that they consented to the entry of certain
- 7-

orders in the Lynn case that imposed Joint and se·:crul lo
on westcor and Bitner Co.

for the filing of bonds arid

tion of the improvements in Park Ridge Estates.
Monson, Tr. 419-20;

John Davis,

Tr.

1104).

Those Wltnc:c;.,,

further acknowledged that in neither the Lynn action nor
instant case have said defendants filed any crossclaims c,.:,,
each other despite Bitner Co. 's denial in this action tl·"1'
was a joint venturer with Westcor or otherwise
the Park Ridge project after November 1,
Tr.

225-227; Douglas Monson, Tr.
15.

1978.

responsi!~lt·

(Blaine f

384-385; John Davis,

On or about June 30, 1980, Bitner Co.

i

'..cc

Tr. 1·

and Westcur

executed a new agreement entitled "Trust Agreement"

(Ex.

2?-

that formalized negotiations conducted by the parties o•.·cr • (Blaine Bitner, Tr.

past several months.

208-209,

2301

provision of that agreement was that Bitner Co. would

3SSJ'0

full, complete and sole responsibility for the Park

P1J~~

ment and completion of the subdivision improvements

t!ler·~1n,

IE

and hold Westcor and Douglas Monson harmless from any 11aL!l.
arising out of the Park Ridge project.
210-211,
16.

537; Douglas Monson,

Tr.

(Blaine Bitner,

~r.

351)

Construction of some of the subdivision irr.nro"'ec.C:"

in Park Ridge was begun in the summer of 1979, but onl·,·

3

cut of the road and a portion of the excavation and lJ" in
sewer and water pipes was completed before the end
(Blaine Bitner, Tr.

207).

In the following :;ear,

0 •

th1•

1CJ8r1,

vation and installation of the sewer and ~uter pipes ~"~
(Dean Rogers, Tr. 44).

Construction of the '.'7ater rc:o•c1 ·:•Jl r

-8-

~ho

remainder

ind

[Ji1'.'1n 1

0r

~he

~ater

s~·stem,

and the laying of road bed

of the roads •,;ere not crJmpleted until the spring
!Dean Rogers, Tr.

17.
~n"·

Bitner ro.

~either

86,

94)

nor 3nyone associated with it had

prior dealings or acouaintance with \vestcor or any of its

orincipals.

!Blaine Bitner, Tr. 130J.

Prior to signing the

;;ovember l, 1978 agreement with l'iestcor, Bitner Co. did not
request or pursue any ivestigation of Westcor or its principals
or the assets it would contribute to the Park Ridge development.
(Blaine Bitner, Tr. 132-136).
18.

Westcor was not incoroorated until January, 1979,

more than two months after Douglas Monson signed the agreement
with Bitner Co. as Westcor's vice president.
Tr. 1049-1050; Ex.

106).

~r.

(Douglas Monson,

Monson testified that Westcor

had only the statutory minimum of assets or capital when formed.
(Douglas

~lonson,

Tr.

266).

~o

documents or records were produced

to substantiate that there was ever a meeting of stockholders or
directors, or that any resolution was ever adopted by the Board
of Directors, or that any action was taken to form and maintain
the corporation itself beyond filing the original Articles of
Incorporation with the Lieutenant Governor's Office in January,
(Douglas

1979.

19.

~1onson,

Tr.

415-416).

The payments received by Westcor from lot purchasers

us monthly payments on lot purchase contracts, and from the
ass1onment of such contracts to other parties, were used by
IJouolas

~Jonson

and \\1estcor in other business ventures or for

other purposes having nothing to do with Park Ridge Estates,
-9-

when obligations on Park Ridge Estates wer'' un::ci1cl '·'
(Douglas Monson,

wise unsatisfied.
Tr.

538; John Davis,

Tr.

Tr.

ii-:;

3i.~1~•t'

805).

* * *
2 5.

During the summer of 1979, Blaine G1tr.er,

president of Bitner Co. was fully a1vare that ;•laint1tfs ·.·,·1·

(Blaine Bitner, Tr.

constructing the two houses.

14_

1

Bitner's excavating company was at that time d1gginu the
for the sewer and water pipes and lay1nc the same next •c
plaintiffs'

(Blaine Bitner, Tr.

lots.

140-142).

one occasion during that summer, Blaine Bitner and c.la1C'tL:··
William Dean Rogers had a conversation at the construct1c·
and Mr. Rogers'

testimony was that Blaine Bitner stc1t0d '"

improvements would be complated before winter set rn.
Rogers, Tr.

54-56).

Later in 1979, and on a large

"'°':--1

e·

occasions prior to November 1980, plaintiffs contacted 2.;;;
Bitner, other representatives of Bitner Co.,
of Westcor,

and recrese:

to notify them that the plaintr ffs'

due, or were past due,

loan -.,·ec:·.'

and could only be paid by scile

house, which could not be sold until the subdi·.'1sion
were completed.

~~
i'.'"· :·

Plaintiffs were repeatedly told by these

that the improvements would be completed first w1th1n 10-.,
before the deadline stated in the Escrow Fund AGrcc~ent
Summit County,

November l,

Patricia Rogers, Tr.

1980.

568-5701.

* * *
35.

Prior to August 2,

1979,

-10-

the defc,"lant

(!-'.crc1:-,-1-=ter
1

,·~1onzo

''Gcr1:1~:-tt"1

Sad::er,

36.

'>>1cd •.he defendant Harold H.

"Uad·:.•r" I

1-..c~·c1nactcr

Just

';:'r.

~_}1f_·

r;)')-()0

1
) ;

Harold Bennett,

to :.1Fr•1s'=

r.rir~r

C:-81,078 t_,.lus

surn of

2,

Bennett

interest.

Tr.

841).

1979 Badger contacted Bennett

1nd rerresented that if Bennett would make a

loan to Westcor,

that he would recei·:e a11 3ssionment of contract receivables from
Park Pidae Estates

t~c

S~bdiv1sion

which would be sold to a third

party financial institution to fund payment of the $81,078 plus
interest,

together with the loan to be made to Westcor.

Badaer, Tr.
37.

661-662;

Harold Bennett, Tr.

On August 2,

':iestcor b•/

promissor~z"

b;· Doualas

~lonso;o

I Ex.

72-::>J .

(Alonzo

845-846).

1979 Be;onett made a loan of $50,000 to
note signed by Badger personally,

!hereinafter ":1onso'1")

and

as president of Westcor.

The loan was made on the represertation of both

Badaer and Monson acting for
of $131,078,

~est=or,

that the entire obligation

beina the existina Badger obligation,

and the

SS0,000 referred to on the promissory note, would be paid in
full,

on or before :·io•:meber 30,

1 1159;

Alonzo Badaer, Tr.
38.

665;

1979.

(Douglas Monson,

Harold Bennett, Tr.

Tr.

297,

852-853).

The aforementioned aoreement was supported by con-

sideration since Bennett would not have made the additional loan
o~

550,000 but for the aareene'1t of both Badger and Monson

1 3ctir.·:i

on behalf of cvf'stco:c)

oblication

o~

the entire

5131,078 nlus interest would be paid in full.

1:,lonzo Badcer,
39.

that by making the loan,

Tr.

6b7;

Harold Bennett, Tr.

In orJer to crovide furds

844,

854,

859)

to pay the obligation,

Badaer and Monson crovided assianmencs of contract and/or note
-11-

receivables on lots in the Park Ridc;e Estates s :Ln!i'.·1:-;
covering Lots 12, 13, 16, 17, 28,
51,

53,

61,

29,

32,

36,

39,

HJ,

and 62, representing that the same had a

tut 11

t."

value, then due and owing of $208, 348.48, sufficient
$131, 078 obligation,

together with interests.

Tr. 305; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 668; Exs.
51,

53,
40.

55,

57,

58,

60,

62,

64,

40,

42,

41,

(Dou·; las .,,
44,

48,

46,

67 and 69).

Badger and Monson (acting on behalf of Westcor)

represented that the contract receivables would be sold to a
third party financial institution by them, on Bennett's acco_and the entire obligation would be paid from the sale of

t~E

same, or in the alternative, that Bonneville Thrift Comoan·
would purchase the contracts.

(Douglas Monson, Tr.

Alonzo Badger, Tr. 673-674; Harold Bennett, Tr.
41.

303,

3'71:

845, 850: ?::.:

At the time of the agreement between Bennett,

P~~

and Westcor, Badger and Monson were partners and had anreeJ
provide assistance to each other in the funding of Westcor.
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 294,

395,

399;

Alonzo Badger, Tr. 671,

718)
42.

The $50,000 received by Westcor on Auc;ust 2,

lq-J

was used by Monson in Westcor and in develooment of the PArh
Ridge Estates subdivision.
407; Alonzo Badger,
43.

661;

(Douglas Monson, i r .

301,

.7.:o-:·

1

Ex. 68).

On behalf of Westcor, Monson executed the ass1 ,,-,-c

on all of the aforementioned contracts and/or note recc1·
to Bennett, and maintained a list of the assionments
records of Westcor.
Badger, Tr. 677).

(Douglas Monson, Tr.
-12-

317,

350;

~1''·

.\lonzo

44.

In relation to the aforementioned lot numbers assigned

to Bennett, Monson lactina on behalf of Westcor)

and Badger

represented that each contract receivable was valid, current
in payments, and was available for assignment.
Tr. 850).

(Harold Bennett,

As to the following lots, the representations made

were false from the inception:
1.
Lot 29.
Lot 29 was a contract receivable represented to be due and owing from William Dean Rogers.
Bennett received an assignment of real estate contracts
receivable represented to be owing from Mr. Rogers on
Lot 29.
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 306). However, Lot 29 was
not sold to William Dean Rogers but was in fact sold to
a Ronald Jacobsen.
In addition, the balance represented
to be owing on said contract was not as represented.
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 333-335; Ex. 70, Ex. 71).

2.
Lots 53, 61, and 62. As to Lots 53, 61, and 62,
each of the contract receivables on said lots had been
assigned to Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. on March 26,
1979, several months prior to the August 2, 1979 agreement
between Bennett, Monson (on behalf of Westcor) and Badger.
(Doualas Monson, Tr. 325, 332-333; Ex. 66, 71).
45.

The court finds that Bennett was frauduently induced

to enter into the August 2, 1979 agreement with Monson (on
behalf of Westcor) and Badger, referred to in these Findings.
This finding of fraud is based upon the following facts found
by clear and convincing evidence:
A.
Badger and Monson/Westcor made representations
to Bennett that if he would advance an additional $50,000
that the entire amount of $131,078 plus interest would be
paid from the proceeds of sales of contract rece~vables
assigned to him.
(Harold Bennett, Tr. 850).
B.
Badger and Monson/Westcor represented to Bennett
that he should not record his assignments since the same
would be immediately marketed and sold.
(Douglas Monson,
Tr. 319, 332; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 673).
C.
The assignments were in fact given to Bennett.
He did not record the same based upon the representations
of Badger and Monson/Westcor, and Bennett did advance the
additional $50,000 which he borrwed from his own bank,
-13-

all in reliance on the representations of Monson.·,;, .._,
and Badger.
(Harold Bennett, Tr. 855, 858).
D.
As evidence of the fraudulent intent of \lu" ·
(on behalf of Westcor) and Badger, the following ass1 •
ments of the same contract receivables given to Bonr·
were made to other individuals and entities as follo~ ..
(1)
Twenty-nine days after entering into the
agreement with Bennett as described above, a10ci Y:·
that Bennett had not recorded his assignments, ~oo
assigned Lot Nos. 12, 13, 16, and 17 to Citizens ~.
knowing that these had already been assianed tu Bee
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 316-318, 376; Exs. 41, 43).
Further, Monson gave no notice or warning of the
further assignment of the contract receivables
prior to doing so.
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 318-319;
Alonzo Badger, Tr. 675).
(2)
On February 13, 1980, Lot Nos. 29 and 51
were assigned to Bonneville Thrift Co. by a docuDec
containing the signature of Monson.
(Ex. 49-D).
(3)
On November 28, 1979, at the request of
Monson, Lots 39, 53, 61 and 62 were released to
John S. Davis and were assigned to M. 0. Bitner
Co., who in turn assigned them to other individua::
not a party to the above action.
(Blaine Bitner,
Tr. 245-246; Douglas Monson, Tr. 330; Exs. 29,
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36).
(4)
On June 30, 1979 (sic) as president o~
Westcor, Monson assigned Lots 36, 40, 41, and 51
to John S. Davis, as Trustee.
(Douglas Monson,
Tr. 321-324).
E.
Throughout the period that the defendants Bade•
and Monson were making assignments of the same contrac~:
previously given to Bennett, Bennett was maintaining
periodic contact with both Badger and Monson concerni~=
the status of the oayment of the agreed-upon obligation.
During said contracts (sic) at no time did either. Bae! :e:·
or Monson notify Bennett that assignments of his contract receivables had been made to other individuals.
(Douglas Monson, Tr. 332; Alonzo Badger, Tr. 675; Ha1·nl:'.
Bennett, Tr. 857).
F.
The representations of Badger and Monsor,/',•ie3 ·_:
were false and known to be so as is clearlv indicate~ L
their actions in immediately assigning the. contracts 1:
other individuals and entities knowina that an assi ~~e·
of the same had already been made to Bennett.
Bad'1 r 1:
Monson/Westcor knew that Bennett had not recorded ~ ~
-14-

assiqnments, and the represented receivable assigned to
him would not be available to pay the obligation as
promised.
( D:Juglas ~-bnson, Tr. 319; Alonzo Badger, Tr.
676-678)
G.
The representations made by Badger and Monson/
Westcor were the only reason Bennett considered making
the additional advance and did induce him to do so.
(Harold Bennett, Tr. 854, 880-881) .
H.
Bennett made a reasonable inquiry and investigation into the receivables involved and based upon the
representations that the contracts would be sold, that
they were all current in payments, that he was dealing
with the president of Westcor (the listed seller on
the contract documents) Bennett acted reasonably and
did not know the falsity of the representations when
he relied upon the same.
(Harold Bennett, Tr. 849-850,
855, 868).
I.
By relying and being induced to act on the
representations of Badger and Monson/Westcor, Bennett
was damaged when the contract receivables were no longer
available to be used by him or on his account to pay
the aforementioned obligations.
(Douglas Monson,
Tr. 344; Harold Bennett, 855).
(R. 766-772, 774,
778-783).
In reliance upon these Findings of Fact the court made
its Conclusions of Law (R. 785-790) and subsequently entered
a Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title.

(R. 792-797).

It is

from this Judgment that the present appeal is taken by
appellant M. 0. Bitner Co.

( R.

811) .

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING
BITNER CO. JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH DEFENDANTS WESTCOR, MONSON, AND
BADGER AS TO THE CROSSCLAIM OF RESPONDENT
BENNETT.
Appellant Bitner Co. attacks the Judgment entered in
favor of respondent Bennett on seven separate grounds.

-15-

While

respondent Bennett believes that some of the
by Appellant overlap and are not

properl~·

ar·::i,~1e;it_,;

seoarable,

f, ,,

convenience of this Court, Respondent will address edc';
arguments raised by Appellant in its brief.
pp.

32-40).

The question of the representation of ,\p!•cllJ:1'.

counsel will be discussed in a subsequent r::oint in tens ':ric
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 40-44).
A.

The Findings of the Lower Court as to
a Joint Venture Between Bitner Co. and
Westcor is Based Cpon Substantial E·:idencc
Which Must be Affirmed on Appeal.

Appellant argues that the lower court erred in concluJ:-.
that a joint venture existed between Bitner Co. and Westcor.
It reincorporates the arguments advanced against the ola1nt,·
that such joint venture did not exist.

Appellant states,

arguments are even stronger with regard to Bennett who ncvec
had any contact with Park Ridge, he merely loaned mone:,·

t'.J

Westcor, Monson and Badger who purported to assign contract'
to secure the loan."

(Appellants' Brief, p.

32).

Respondent Bennett believes that the arguments advance"
by Appellant as to its claim that no joint venture exists
been thoroughly treated in the Brief filed by respondents
Rogers.

(Brief of Plaintiffs, pp. 13-22).

Respondent

Scnc,,

therefore, incorporates and adopts the reason1no advanced t
them in their Brief.
Some additional comments, however, arc appror.•::-1atc.
it cannot be emphasized enough that the question as to ~net
a joint venture exists is one of fact.
-16-

Strand v.

Crannc~

)I

.2d

t·

~~5
33~

Ii

Stone v. First Wyoming Bank, 625

tah 1980).

(10th Cir. 1980); P

&

M

Cattle Co. v. Holler, 559

Only in those cases where but one

<' . 2 d 1 Jl 9 I\·<· o . 1916 i .

inference can be drawn by a reasonable man can the question be
decided as a matter of law.
commission, 424 P.2d 236

Long v. State Industrial Accident

(Ore. 1967).

Second, the "existence of the joint venture must deoend
upon the facts of each case and formality of agreement is less
important than the acts and conduct of the parties, and the
facts that exist in each particular case."
611 P.2d 367,
295,

296

369

(Utah 1980); Strand v.

Score v. Wilson,

Cranney, 607 P.2d

(Ctah 1980).

Furthermore, the intent of the parties is controlling and
is to be gleaned from the conduct, the surrounding circumstances,
and the transactions between the parties.
tJYoming Bank, 625 F.2d 332, 340

Stone v. First

(10th Cir. 1980).

It is also a well-settled rule for the factfinder to
discard terminology utilized by the parties themselves in
characterizing their relationship and,

for example, the

inclusion of the term "joint venture" in an agreement does not
necessarily make it one if the elements of a joint venture are
missing.
~45

Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc.,

P. 2d 684

(Ctah 1982).

Conversel•;, the exclusion of that

term or the characterization b;· the parties that a joint venture
does not exist is also not controllins since it is facts not
characterizations that
venture.

deter~ine

.'1ercer •:. Vinson,

the existence of a joint

336 P. 2d 854

-1 7-

(Ariz. 1959).

Finally, this Court has applied the trad1tional

,11:

of appellate review in cases involvir.q a Joint •:c:-.t ;r·:>
and has held that where the trial court's f1ndiwF; and
are supported by substantial, credible evidence they ar•
to a presumption of correctness.

Score v. Wilson, 611

367 (Utah 1980); Lynch v. MacDonald,

367 P.2d 464

In such cases the findings and judament cannot be

!' .. '

(l'ta:1 l!•
•

dist~r

on appeal.
Further, this Court has the duty to review evidence 1r
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and

1·1i

disturb the trial court's determination as trier of fact

11
1~

weighing the credibility of the witnesses where reasonable
could differ as to the weight to be given to conflictic1·:
dence.

Koesling v. Basamakis,

539 P.2d 1043

~·

(Ctah 19/S!.

Applying the preceding principles to the facts and t .. ~
findings in this case result in the inescapable conclusion
that the lower court was justified in concluding that a
venture existed between Bitner Co. and Westcor.

JOI

The lm·1er

court in its Conclusions of Law summarized its basis for
making this determination as follows:
Taken together, the elements of the aareement
between Bitner Co. and Westcor, and the actions of
those parties, both jointly and severally and before
and after entering into their agreement, constitut0
a joint venture partnership.
Of particular sicrn1 f ic· 1'
to that determination are the de facto sharina of
,-·
the combining of assets (the land---ar:ld de•.•e lorn;,en t
by Bitner Co. and the financinq and construc~ion
subdivision improvements by \'lestcor), the mutual r: " ·
to market lots in the project, the assumption of
responsibility for the pro]ect by Bitner Co. as
developer on several occasions after enterinc into 1·
agreement with Westcor, the sharinq of savin~s from
-18-

~

installing the subdivision improvements, and the other
instances enumerated in Findings of Fact No. 6 through
15 (contained in this Brief, pp. 3-8, supra) where
Bitner Co. retained substantial control and responsibility over the Park Pidge project at all times.
These numerous considerations, and the degree of
shared responsibility and control generally, are
consistent with a Joint uenture partnership and
inconsistent with the claim of Oitner Co. that it was
merely a seller of the undeveloped land that retained
nothing more than a seller's security interest in the
land after entering into the agreement with Westcor.
(R. 786-787).
It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the many factors
which the lower court considered in determining that a joint
venture existed.

However, certain of the arguments now raised

by Appellant in its brief must be briefly addressed.

It should

be observed that the appellant attempts to dissect the totality
of circumstances which occurred during the entire transaction
and focus upon specific clauses contained in the contracts or
upon specific events.

As noted earlier, however, it is the

circumstances and facts viewed as a whole which determine a
joint venture and not isolated instances pointed out by one or
the other party.

With this precept in mind, it remains to examine

the specific arguments made by Appellant.
There Was an Element of Loss.
First, Appellant claims that there was no element of loss
in the transaction and therefore no joint venture can be said
to exist.

(Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-13).

The absence of

"loss" language in the agreement is easily understood since
neither party at the time the transaction was entered into
thouaht they could sustain a loss.
wrong as will be discussed.
-19-

This belief, however, proved

As to Bitner Co. it refused to give up title to its

~

as had been proposed by other developers who wanted to jo111•
venture the project.

(Tr. 492, 1023-1024).

Gilner Co. wcis

definitely against these proposals since it would lose the
interest in the land and be subordinated to the efforts of
the developers.

The offer by Westcor, however, was differcn·

in that Bitner Co. retained title to the land and specifica":
under the contract was to receive a percentage of the proceed,
of the sale of each lot as it occurred.

(Ex.

23-P,

p.

4).

Only when Bitner Co. received its full share of the proceeds
of the sale was it required to give up title to its land.

Ti'.'c;

if Westcor was unable to sell the lots or did not fully devc:c
the land as agreed, Bitner Co. lost nothing since it still
retained the land and gained the benefit of any work and imorcments actually made by Westcor.

(Leland Bitner, Tr.

1025-102'

Bitner Co. believed that Westcor was risking $284,400
which it had supposedly deposited with Utah Security Mortgaae
as an escrow as required by Summit County.

Bitner Co. undout·

believed that this escrow would protect it against any losses
incurred as a result of Westcor's improvement work.

This is

the only explanation as to why Bitner Co. was not even

cancer~

with any of the financial history or assets of Westcor since
the officers of the company obviously assumed that the escroc
amount was a sufficient contribution into the joint venture
protecting Bitner Co. from any loss.
Unbeknownst to Bitner Co. , however, Wes teer had di f ~ e c-e··
plans.

Because of its arrangement with Utah Security Mortca·
-20-

owned

b~

Alonzo Badger, a false certification of the escrow

';;as made.

Badger and Monson agreed that they would utilize

the money obtained from the sales of the lots to cover the
improvements and therefore no out-of-pocket money was required
by either Badger or Monson once the false certificate of deposit
had been made.

(Tr. 702, 716).

Under this arrangement Westcor

had nothing to lose and everything to gain since it would provide the improvements only as the lots were sold.
Had Westcor properly utilized the money obtained from the
sale of the lots then this scheme would have succeeded.

By

diverting a portion of the funds from the sales of the lots,
however, funds were not available to make the improvements and
the subsequent lawsuits and other events therefore occurred.
As Bitner Co. found out the old addage was true that
"the best laid plans of mice and men oft go astray."

Bitner

Co. and its principals discovered subsequently that the lack
of a real bond with Utah Mortgage Co. and the failure of
Monson to do his agreed upon improvements created a true "loss"
situation.

Since it had signed the escrow agreement with Summit

County and, even more importantly, was named as a defendant
in a lawsuit by various property owners who were claiming
damages for the loss of improvements being completed, it
became necessary for the Bitner brothers to mortgage their
various houses in order to come up with the court-ordered bond
protecting the property owners.

(Tr. 995-998).

Thus, while it appeared to both Westcor (under the guise
of its fraud)

and to Bitner Co. that no loss could be sustained
-21-

to either party, the realities of the situation resuitod in
Bitner Co. being liable for the misapprorriation ot fc1n,b ,,
Westcor.

These facts certainly give rise to the f 1nd1 nc;

t;,,,.,

a joint venture agreement existedin spite of Appellant's
assertion that the written words of the contract did not
mention the word "loss".
There Was Profit Sharing.
Appellant argues that "Westcor was obligated to pa'/
Bitner Co. the total purchase price for the land no matter
what the financial results of the development to Westcor woul:
be.

II

(Appellants' Brief, p. 13).

Under this theory Bitner

~

simply sold a piece of real estate to Westcor and had no
further concern as to what occurred to it.

Thus, accordin·:

to the theory, if Westcor defaulted Bitner Co. could sue
Westcor for its damages.
This "theory" was argued to the court below which reJec:e
it categorically.

Such rejection was entirely proper.

HaJ

Bitner Co. been looking to Westcor as a buyer of undevelocei
real estate it certainly would have investigated its financ1'
status and been concerned as to whether it would have been
able to develop the property and make the payments as the
tract required.

However, this was not the case.

A

~cc·

revie«"'

r,~

the contract agreement shows that the $400,000 sales price
merely a guesstimate of the anticipated profits that the
division would bring in after it had been developed.
The contract contemplated that the money fron the
each lot would be divided as it accrued.
-22-

There was no

sal~
m1n1~:

f,,a·;n1L"1t required u!1rler thP contract nor was any interest charged.
This open-ended contract therefore permitted Bitner Co. to
receive half of the proceeds of the sale of the lots as they
were sold thereb:/ automaticall/ making a "profit" with each
sale.
Since the lots were sold in accordance with the Bitner
plans and specifications and the prices projected as to each
lot,

the $400,000 contract price included the built-in projected

profits.

The unusual nature of this contract arrangement clearly

substantiated the lower court's finding that the contract price
was really not material and that the arrangement was made in
order to allow Bitner Co. the tax advantages of an installment
contract sale

(which is based not upon the stated contract

sale price but upon the amount of each installment as it is
received annually).
The statement by Blaine Bitner that he had agreed to
split the profits with Westcor
by Mr. Davis

(Tr.

234)

and the statement made

(as attorney for both parties in the Lynn case)

to the same effect

(Tr.

1112) directly contradicts the position

now argued by Appellant.
Finally,

the fact that Bitner Co. and its partners were

given financial rewards for selling lots and,

in addition, were

to be credited with any savings in the projected cost of development indicated that Bitner Co. was indeed a partner in the
development of this property and not merely a vendor of raw land.
Bitner's Control Over the Development.
Appellant next argues that Bitner Co. was to have no control
-2 3-
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These documents together with the various court ord0rs
the Lynn case requiring joint obligations D'/ both Westcor
Bitner Co. clearly substantiate the lower court's conclu:"1
that a joint venture existed and any claims to the contrar:
are simply without merit.
Finally, as to respondent Bennett, Appellant argues

t~2·

"Bitner Co. incurred no risk of loss and no profits from
dealing with Bennett and had no control of any sort over
loan from Bennett.

a~

Bennett's transactions meet none of the

joint venture criteria recognized by this Court with regard
to Bitner Co."

(Appellants' Brief, pp.

This misstate

32-33)

the applicable law relating to joint ventures.

Once a

joint

venture has been established between Westcor and Bitner Co.
it is immaterial whether Bitner Co. was aware of the develoc:ccobligation incurred by Westcor to Bennett.

Bitner' s know le,:: :

0

of the transaction has no bearing upon Bitner's liability.
Stauffer v. Ti Hang Lung

&

Co., 84 P.2d 209

M.J.B. Investments v. Coxwell, 611 P.2d 440

(Cal. App.
(Wyo.

1938,

1980).

For these reasons, therefore, a joint venture clearly
existed between M. 0. Bitner Co. and Westcor and Bitner Co.
is now responsible to respondent Bennett for the debt incur,-,
therein.
B.

The Lower Court Correctly Found that
Bitner Co. Was Liable for the Wronaful
Acts Perpetrated by Westcor and Badger
in Defrauding Bennett.

Appellant in its Brief states the followina

subhead!~'

"There was no Joint Venture by Estoppel for a Third Part
-26-

11

r·'cqard

tn Bennett.

II

(;,ppellants' Brief, p.

331.

The argument

1,i·:anccd under th1 s cc;ubooi'.1t is to t'le effect that Bennett
ne·:er has claimed or al lec:ed that Bitner r'o.

was a member of

the partnership between Westcor and Badger and therefore Bitner

I Id. I

co. cannot be liable for the actions of that partnership.

It is impossible to resoond directly to the argument raised
by Appellant since it has formulated a concept which is both
legally incorrect and which has never been raised by Bennett.
Bennett has never made a claim that there is any liability on
the part of M. 0. Bitner Co. by way of estoppel.

Partnership

by estoppel is statutorily defined in §48-1-13, U.C.A and is
modeled after the Uniform Partnership Act.

In order to have

a partnership by estoppel it is necessary that the person to
whom the representation is made rely upon such representation
and believe that person to be a partner.
239 P. 2d 749

Bates v. Simpson,

(Utah 1952).

In this case it is clear that respondent Bennett was never
told by anyone that Bitner Co. was a partner of Monson, of
Badger, or of Monson-Badger.

Similarly, Bennett never relied

uoon the existence of M. 0. Bitner Co.
requested by Monson and Badger.

in lending the money as

Thus, none of the elements of

estoppel have ever been claimed by Bennett and therefore the
discussion by Appellant is irrelevant and meaningless.
On the other hand, Appellant seems to be stating that
because Bennett was not aware of the existence of M. O. Bitner
Co. that it necessarily follows therefore that M. o. Bitner
Co. cannot be liable for the debts incurred by Westcor.
- 2 7-

If

this is the argument now being advanced by

,\1 L~"llant

it

clearly incorrect.
It is elementary that joint venturers bear the same r,
to each other as to partners in a partnership.
&

Reed Co., 510 P. 2d 1104 (Utah 1973).

Hammer

This Court man

'•~•-

ago established that a joint venture is governed by the

la~

partnership insofar as the rights of the parties are concer:.

0

Forbes v. Butler, 242 P. 950 (Utah 1925); Lane v. Peterson,
251 P. 374 (Utah 1926).
As noted before, the lower court was entirely correct ,
concluding that M. 0. Bitner Co. and Westcor comprised a io1·•
venture and therefore were essentially partners for
of legal analysis.

purpos~s

The objective of the partnership in

t~1s

case was the development of the Park Ridge Estates project.
Such joint ventures or partnerships are not uncommon.

i'.s

noted by the Oregon Supreme Court in a similar type of case:
They were engaged in a business venture for
the development of a subdivision.
That business
venture required construction of curb, grading of
roads and installation of gas, electricity, sewer
and water lines.
The extensive development of
property in such a manner, together with the intent
to exert joint control and share the profits or
losses, is sufficient to establish a partnership
or joint venture. Stone-Fox, Inc. v. Vandehev
Development Co., 626 P.2d 1365 (Ore. 1981).
The Westcor-M. 0. Bitner Co. partnership is the only rrwhich has been claimed by either plaintiffs or respondent
Bennett.

The relationship of Alonzo Badger to Monson

that of a sub-partnership.

~as

The concept of a sub-nartncrsJ.1_

is described as follows:

-28-

" s1;b-1~artncrshi0 is a so-called partnership
formed between a men~er of a partnership and a third
:.erson for a division of the profits coming to him
from the rartnership enterprise, by an agreement of
such character as to disclose the essentials necessary
to a uartnership between the oartner and the third
nerson.
How profits between the me~ers of a subpartnership are to be divided is immaterial, and
the mere fact that the one who is not a partner of
the original partnership is to receive the entire
crof1ts of the business will not prevent the formation of a sub-partnership.
The sub-partners are
par~ners inter se, but a sub-partner does not become
a member of thef)artnership since there is no agreement
between him and the other partners, even though the
sub-partnershiu agreement is known to the other members
of the firm.
59 Am. Jur.2d, Partners.bl.l:, §16, p. 941.
The testimony of both

~onson

and Badger show unequivocably

that their relationship was that of a sub-partnership.
Badger represented
Douglas Monson.

hi~self

Alonzo

at trial and as such cross-examined

The following dialogue occurred:

Q.

(By Mr. Badger)
Do you recall the discussion
in trying to put this venture together where a
proposal was made that we enter into a partnership
and that I take a percentage of your share from
the project?

.:\.

Yes.

Q.

Do you recall what that percentage was?

A.

No,

Q.

Was there ever

i\.

:Jo.
You were always going to formalize something,
but you ne\rer did.

Q.

And did you ever make any attempt to formalize or

A.

:Jo.

Q.

Sign any agreement.
Do you think that could have
been the reason that I entered into an agreement
and pledged $284,000 in assets?

A.

I'm sure it was.

I don't.
any agreement signed or prepared?

Q.

And that agreement was never executed,
correct?

f\.

is Lilat

To my knowledae, No.
(Tr.

Likewise,

399-400 I .
in a dialogue between Mr. Badger and

(attorney for both \•lestcor and M. 0. Bitner Co.)

~r.

-~

the follu,·.1·

statements were made:
Q.

(By Mr. Davis)
All right.
Was it your understanding under the document (the Summit County
Escrow Agreement) that you did tell Mr. Murphy
to sign that you had an obligation of some sort
relating to Park Ridge Estates?

A.

Absolutely.

Q.

In the amount of $284,000?

A.

Absolutely.

Q.

Was that obligation to in some way pay for the
improvements that go into Park Ridge Estates?

.'..

No.
It was to act as a guarantee that if the
improvements weren't in that funds could be drawn
against by the county to pay for the imcrovements

Q.

What was your reason for taking on that obliaat10":

A.

Doug Monson and I had a partnership, verbal partne~
ship agreement, that was never executed that I woll: ·
participate in his share of the partnership proceed'
(Tr. 701-702)

Absolutely.

* * *
Q.

(By Mr. Davis)
Now, when you entered into this
partnership agreement with Mr. Davis, which resul•c
in you taking on an obligation of $284, 000, 1-1~•at '. :

you get in return?

A.

I received probably $15,000 or $20,000 in thP
of 1980.

* * *
Q.

In the spring of when?

- 30-

1980?

SLl"

~:o.

~1d

':ou

~~e

0:1e-~al~

·-'-·

1es.

Q.

~hat

:--:a~:e

was

t~at

sc:-"e basis
~::.;~t be?

:or deli\·er-::.:1"""7

', s.::.cl

".d--i.3t

basis~

.0,.

Just reviewino the subdivision and the potential
sales and potential, the estimated development
costs and the amount of the bond.

Q.

Had you seen the document whereby Westcor ourchased
the land.

A.

No.

Q.

From~-

A.

No, not at that--

Q.

What did you estimate Westcor's interest to be
before you were to get your 50%? What was the full
amount that Westcor was to receive in your estimation?

A.

I had in mind some half million dollars gross.

Q.

And you were to get half of that?

A.

No.

Q.

Did you understand that Westcor had the obligation
of putting in--

A.

Yes.

Q.

$284' 000?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Westcor then was to receive a half million, and ii
they put in $284,400 then they were to have roughly
$250,000?

0.

Bitner Co.?

Half of the net.

-31-

A.

That is approximately.

Q.

Then you were to get half of that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you understand that you may have to put out
the full $284,000?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that calculated in this?

A.

That was in the gross.

Q.

Did you figure then that you would pay this and
then you would get half of this?

A.

Yes, but I may have to pay the $284,000, yes.

Q.

Okay.
Did you receive any contracts to cover the
$284,000?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And what was the total face value of those

One half.

contrac~'

* * *
A.

Well, I think the records I put up yesterday was
probably the best estimate.
But in addition to
that there was, there was a couple of other contro:·
It would have been about $ 250, 000, I would recollec:-(Tr. 702, 711-713).

Thus, the testimony is clear that the partnership in

t~d'

case was between Westcor and M. 0. Bitner Co. with a side

su~

partnership between Westcor and Badger.

~

Bitner Co.

The liability of

is thus predicated on the actions of Monson and

Westcor in incurring the debt for the benefit of the venture.
With this clarification of the relationship among

~onso·

Westcor, M. 0. Bitner Co. and Badger it remains to examine
whether Bennett's lack of knowledge of the

~-

O. Bitner Co.

relationship is fatal to a claim against this comoany.
alleges "Bennett neither saw nor could allege that he thouch:
- 32-

there was privit; or any relationshio with or between Bitner
Co. and his loan."

(Appellants' Brief, p.

statement is not disputed by

res~ondent

33).

Again, this

Bennett since knowledge

of Bennett as to Bitner Co. 's partnership is immaterial to
Bitner's liability.

68 C.J .S. Partnership, §16l(c), pp. 606-607.

In Gardenhire v. Ray,

23 N.E.2d 927 (Ill. 1939) the court

held that where a partnership relation existed between a
defendant and a co-defendant for the development of an oil well
the defendant was liable on a contract executed by the codefendant with plaintiff for drilling of the well whether or
not the plaintiff knew of the defendant's connection with the
well.
Likewise, in Raymond S. Roberts, Inc. v. White, 97 A.2d
245 (Vt. 1953) the Supreme Court of Vermont held that where
one partner purchases property upon his individual credit for
the partnership but the seller is not aware of the existence
of the partnership the seller may, when he discovers it, have
benefit of the partnership liability.
Finally, as noted in a leading treatise, the liability of
an undisclosed joint venture is no different than that of an
undisclosed partner.
As in the case of partnerships, the undisclosed
joint venturer is liable for acts performed by his
associates providing they are acting within the scope
of their authority. This is consistent with the general
rules of agency.
§186 of the Restatement of the Law of
Agency provides:
An undisclosed principal is bound by contracts
and conveyances made on his account by an agent
acting within his authority . .
It is elementary
that the fact that a third person has theretofore
- 33-

dealt with the agent as principal docs ;iot .:iffcct
the liability of the principal upon disco~cry.
Even after discovery of the identity of the
principal, the fact that such a third person
looks only to the agent for payment or perforrnanc·
does not affect the principal's liability.
C.C.H., Business Organizations, §41.10 [2, p.
1166-67].

As noted earlier, it is also immaterial whether or net
Bitner Co. was aware that Monson had entered into a loan
agreement with Bennett in order to obtain financing for the
development.

All partners are jointly and severally liable

for the acts of a partner concerning partnership business.
Stauffer v. Ti Hang Lung & Co., 84 P.2d 209 (Cal. App. 1938):
see §48-1-6, U.C.A.

(1).

For these reasons,

therefore, the

arguments raised by Appellant in its "Estoppel" section are
without merit and must be rejected.
C.

The Debt Owing to Bennett Was For the
Benefit of the Park Ridge Estates
Development and Therefore M. 0. Bitner
Co. is Liable.

Next, Appellant argues that even if a joint venture ex1•
between Bitner Co. and Westcor/Monson that the Bennett oblication was made solely to another partnership consistina of
Westcor/Monson and Badger and therefore Bitner is not liable.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35).
As discussed in the previous section, however,
terization is incorrect.

this cha:e

The evidence is undisputed that

s~c

and Monson only entered into an arrangement for the so le f :a
of sharing the profits from the Park Ridge Estate venture.
unlike the examples cited in Appellants' Brief, this is n~t •

- 34-

instance ',;here a person is a member of two separate and
distinct partnerships each havinq a separate and independent
purpose.
Alonzo Badger testified that he had been informed by
Monson that the subdivision investment was faltering because
Monson was unable to meet the improvement obligations and had
been served with notices of default by various persons.
6 61) .

(Tr.

It was Badger's idea that the needed financing could

be obtained from Bennett provided that real estate contracts
could be given to Bennett so that he would feel secure in making
any loans.

Monson verified this testimony and again stated

that the money was needed in
Ridge project.

o~der

to pay bills on the Park

(Tr. 370).

Monson/Westcor was obviously desperate for money in order
to keep the venture alive.

Monson was therefore willing to agree

with Bennett that if Bennett would lend the necessary cash,
Westcor would secure the debt obligation with over $200,000 of
contract receivables, would pay Bennett the full amount borrowed
plus a previous amount owed to Badger, and would pay the total
obligation within three months after the loan had been made by
Bennett.
Appellants' attempt to create two separate partnership
entities is fruitless based upon the record.

The lower court

concluded correctly that money given to Monson/Westcor for the
purpose of developmental expenses was for the benefit of the
joint venture with Bitner Co. and therefore Bitner Co. was liable
for this obligation.

It is immaterial that the money advanced
- 35-
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Crossclaim of Harold Bennett shows
'-'''er raised,

(!'.

"l.

t~at

1

'

1

•

Bit;-ier Co.

to

the

no such defense was

Other affirmative defenses scch

679-~82).

Js waiver and contributory

=._,::_s:.r1ct,

ne~ligence

were clead, however.

At no time in the trial did Bitner Co. claim that

~onson

had exceeded his partnerhsip authority by assigning the contracts to Bennett.

In fact, quite to the contrary, Bitner Co.

has argued throughout this litiaation that it has never been
a partner with Monson/Westcor and therefore is not liable for
any acts of Monson.
The failure to raise this defense in the lower court
precludes Bitner's attempt to now do so in this Court.

It is

fundamental that defenses and claims not raised by the carties
in the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on
Bangerter v.

appeal.
v.

Mower,

597 P.2d 855

Even assuming
not been waived,

Poulton, 663 P.2d 100
(Utah 1979).

arguend~,

however,

that this defense has

there is sufficient evidence to conclude that

the Uniform Partnership Act was followed.
~uoreme

(Utah 1983); Heath

The CaliLirnia

Court in one of the few cases dealing with that section

of the Uniform Partnership Act codified as 48-1-6, U.C.A. held
that there is no requirement that assent to assignment of
partnershi; procerty for the benefit of a creditor be reduced
- 37-

same period of time, while preparing the defenses in the

L"n·

lawsuit, Monson prepared a record of the assigned lots,
including those assigned to Bennett and showed them to Dav1r
(Tr. 3 5 0, 4 2 3) .

Blaine Bitner stated that during this sar',"

period of time he began to suspect that something was seriou
wrong when people started suing him.

(Tr.

224).

He furthor

stated that he did not feel he could trust Monson by the tir•
the agreement in June of 1980 was made.

(Tr. 539).

In June of 1980 the "Trust Agreement" was executed by
Westcor and Bitner acting through Douglas Monson and Blaine
Bitner respectively.

Shortly thereafter on July 22 at the

Jim Lynn hearing, Mr. Davis, again representing M. 0. Bitner
Co., made a statement to the court that he foresaw a dissiLac_
to those parties who had not yet recorded their contracts and
that he felt it necessary to give some kind of recording on
the public record to give notice in order to mitigate the
damages and protect the assets.

Davis testified that he was

referring to the Trust Agreement when he made this statement
(Tr. 816-817).
Davis further admitted

that on five different occasions

during the Lynn proceedings he told the court of his concern
at the time of entering into the Trust Agreement in that
Badger or whomever held the contracts had assigned them to
unknown people.

(Tr. 828).

Whether the contracting party to an agreement
to make a person or class of persons a beneficiac
of fact which must be decided by the trier of fact.
-40-

intendc~

is a

1uc'c'

Clark ·

American Standard, Inc.,

583 P.2d 618 (Utah 1978).

Based upon

the evidence before the court there was every reason for the
court to conclude that Bennett fell within the category of
those persons the hold harmless agreement was designed to
Obviously, Bitner Co. through its president or its

encompass.

attorney had sufficient knowledge that wrongdoing was prevalent
as to the real estate contracts held by both Badger and Monson.
It was reasonable for the court to conclude that Bennett, both
as a contract holder and as a creditor of the subdivision
improvements, could be asserting claims against Monson/Westcor
in the future and that therefore Bitner Co. was assuming such
obligations.
Since Bitner Co. negligently placed itself in the position
of allowing Monson and Badger to cause the chaos and fraud which
resulted in 1979 and 1980 it is only equitable that Bitner Co.
be held to an agreement which it entered solely for the purpose
of eliminating the Monson/Westcor liability and allowing it the
opportunity to salvage the project and protect it interest.
(Tr.

208).
F.

The Lower Court Correctly Found Bitner
Co. Jointly Liable for any Fraudulent
Conduct Committed by Monson/Westcor.

Appellant contends that because the lower court found that
Monson/Westcor and Badger had specifically committed fraud
against Bennett whereas Bitner Co. neither participated in nor
was aware of the fraud committed against Bennett, that it is
therefore improper to assess joint liability against Bitner Co.

-41-

for the fraud of others.

(i\ppellants' Brief,

argument further continues that this JOint

r:r. 38- o9J.

liabilit~

was

necessarily based upon the hold harmless clause of the

~,,

'Jsc

Agreement and such clause is therefore invalid as a Matt0r
public policy.

(Id.)

There are two reasons why this argument is invalid.
the question as to the validity of the hold harmless

agre0~~

in a fraudulent context is academic since under the laws of
partnership Bitner Co. is liable for Westcor's fraud regarcl•
of any contractual agreement between the partners.

Second,

0

c

authority relied upon by Appellant is distinguishable and doe•
not apply to this situation.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered b
lower court recognize that a debt on behalf of the
was incurred to Bennett.

partners~~

The fraud of Monson and Badger, as

by Appellant himself (Appellants' Brief, p.

38)

in no way a£'e

the debt but only the security which was given for the debt.
other words, the contracts which were assigned to Bennett we'"
dissipated by the fraudulent actions of Monson and Badger.
elimination of the security, however, does not eliminate

t~~

underlying debt which still exists to the partnership.
It is fundamental partnership law that a partnershio is
bound by a partner's wrongful acts.

Section 48-1-10, c.c.:

states the following:
Where by any wrongful act or omission of an:·
partner acting in the ordinary course of the
business of the partnership or with the authorit··
of his co-partners loss or injur~ is caused to a~~
person, not being a partner in the partnership,
"
or any penalty is incur red, the oartne rsh i c is
-42-

liable therefor to the same extent as the partner
so act1nq or omitting to act.
In aJdition, Section 48-1-11 provides:

The partnership is bound to make good the loss:
(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his
apparent authority receives money or property of a
third person and misapplies it; and, (2) where the
partnership in the course of its business receives
money or propert:/ of a third person and the money or
property so received is misapulied by any partner
while it is in the custody of the partnership.
finally, Section 48-1-12 provides:
All partners are liable:
( 1) jointly and
severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11; ( 2) jointly
for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate
obligation to perform a partnership contract.
This statutory concept emanates from the Uniform Partnership
Act.

Courts applying this same act have stated the following:
There is no merit in the contentions that
fraudulent concealment by one partner may not be
imputed to another partner.
"The individual partners
. are liable in a civil action for the fraudulent
misconduct of a partner within the course or scope
of the transactions and business of the partnership,
whether such misconduct be by fraudulent representations or otherwise, even though the co-partners had no
knowledge of the fraud and did not participate therein.
68 C.J.S. Partnership §170, p. 620; Kearns v. Sparks,
260 S.W2d 353, 360 (Mo. App. 1953). Martin v. Barbour,
558 S.W.2d 200, 209 IMo. App. 1977).

See also, A. Sam & Sons Produce Co. v. Campese, 217 N.Y.S.2d
275

(N. Y. App.

1961).

Thus, under Utah law and general partnership law concepts
Bitner Co. is jointly liable for any fraud committed by Monson/
Westcor independent of the Trust Agreement which was entered into
in June of 1980.

Appellant's trial counsel acknowledged to

the lower court that a finding of fraud as to Westcor would be
-43-

imputed to Bitner Co.

(Tr. 976).

to utilize the Trust Agreement in order to sustain the

1,,,.

court's finding of joint liability for the Bennett obl1=.,1.1
Even so, the June 1980 Trust Agreement would st111 f,Jc,
basis for Bennett's enforcement of any obligation based
fraud.

w'O,"

The Trust Agreement provided that Bitner Co. aqrr'•'s

to hold Westcor and Monson harmless of any liability

aris1~:

out of the development of the Park Ridge Estates subdiv1si
Since the evidence showed that Bitner did not trust Monson
the time the agreement was made

(Tr.

539) and in fact belie"'':

that Westcor had cheated Bitner Co. as to the original
1978 agreement (Tr. 225)

3t

~ove~·

it is not reasonable to assume t 11at

Bitner Co. was aware that fraud could have been committed b'
but nevertheless agreed to make good on such fraud even thouuwas already obligated to do so under the partnership act.
On the other hand, as between Monson/Westcor and Bitnec
the argument now raised by Appellant could certainly be made
any agreement by Bitner Co. to assume the full responsibilit·
the partnership debts is invalid since some of these debts :c•:·
fraudulently induced.

The Lamb case cited by Appellant :coui ·

then be applicable because to allow the enforcement of the
as between lvestcor and Bitner Co. would immunize Westcor •re
own fraud.

Since this question, however, does not conccrr :•

and since no crossclaim has ever been filed by either vies'"''
Bitner Co. against each other the answer to these auestion::
irrelevant to this appeal.
The lower court correctly found that Bitner Co. was ,01:•
-4 3-

liable uoon the debt to Bennett under traditional partnership
law regardless of whether the debt was induced by fraudulent
means and whether the security for such debt had been fraudulently
misued by Monson.

The obligation on the debt must still be paid

by Westcor's partner Bitner Co.
G.

The Lower Court was Correct in Declaring
Bitner Co. Severally Liable for Punitive
Damages and Attorneys' Fees.

Finally, Appellant argues that it is improper for Bitner
Co. to be held liable for punitive damages and for attorneys'
fees when it did no wrong itself and is in effect punishing an
innocent party.

Likewise, Bitner Co., according to Appellant,

should not be assessed attorneys' fees since it was not involved
in the fraud committed by Monson and Badger.
pri.

(Apoellants' Brief,

39-40).
For the same reasons stated in the previous section this

argument is without merit.

A partnership under §48-1-10, U.C.A.

is liable for any penalties assessed against a partner "to the
same extent as the partner so committing or omitting to act."
Section 48-1-12 provides that all partners are jointly and
severally liable for everything chargeable to the partnership
under §48-1-10 and 48-1-11.
Bitner Co. has misstated the concept of partnership.
Essentially the law views Bitner Co. and Westcor as one individual and it is immaterial whether Bitner Co. was innocent of any
wrongdoing if it was a partner of Westcor and if Westcor itself
committed a wrongful act.

Partnerships have been held liable

for assaults by partners (30 A.L.R.2d 859) and for the embezzle-44-
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to rely upon the TRust Agreement as one means of obta1ninu
liability against both entities.
The Canons of Ethics as quoted by Appellant are sif'l:,J'
that.

They are a guideline to attorneys as to what c0nduct

they may and may not ethically perform.

It was Davis'

many years prior to the actual trial of this case to

0Ll1c1>,

disa~30c

himself with one or the other client if he believed a COJ1fl::·
even possibly could have existed.

He did not do so, nor JiJ

any of the respective clients request him to do so.
It is extremely unlikely that had Bitner Co.

prevail~J

in

this trial and had an appeal been prosecuted by these resronacc
that any claim would then be made that a new trial was req1111"
because of a conflict of interest by Bitner's attorney.
Bitner Co. 's decision to retain Davis throughout this

lit1~a::

and it is therefore Bitner Co. 's problem or Davis' problel'l tc
certainly is not the problem of either Plaintiffs or
Bennett.
nev~r

res~onJe

Since, as noted by the plaintiffs, the lower cour•

asked to declare a mistrial because of this conflict,

it would be a misstatement to say that the lower court corr 0 c:
denied such mistrial.

Perhaps more correctly it could be ':a

that had Appellants properly raised the issue durinq

trial•·~

the lower court should certainly ha•1e denied it and an',' iss '"'
on appeal should be resolved in favor of these

resoondent~,

CONCLUSION
Entering into a joint venture or a partnership is
serious decision.

While there are unquestionabl"'

-47-

d

numcrou~

'

advantages that can be derived from such a relationship
there are also liabilities and disadvantages.
Bitner Co.

In this case

failed to exercise reasonable care in selecting

a company to co-develop the Park City subdivision.

Bitner Co.

failed to check on the background, the assets, or the reliability
of Westcor or Douglas Monson.

Bitner Co. assumed that since it

still retained title to the land that it had little to lose by
joining with an unknown entity.

This assumption was obviously

incorrect.
Because of Bitner Co. 's carelessness in placing Monson
and Westcor in a position to deal with third parties, Bitner
Co. is jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions
of its joint venturer.

This liability arises not only from

traditional laws of partnership but also from Bitner Co. 's
decision to hold Westcor harmless for any acts concerning its
involvement with the subdivision.
After Bitner Co. took over the sole control of the development a successful subdivision was completed.

Bitner Co.,

according to the testimony of its president, is now financially
successful in the venture and is receiving income from the
numerous lots which were sold.

(Tr. 540-542).

Thus, aside

from any legal theories or requirements it is only right that
Bitner Co. compensate both the plaintiffs and respondent
Bennett for their losses incurred as a

resul~

of their involve-

ment with the subdivision.
In summary, the lower court carefully weighed the evicence
which was introduced by the parties during a five-day trial.
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